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 This article analyzes possible procedures for political secession. 
After a literature review of theories of secession, the article presents 
the main arguments against and for secession. Than, on the basis of 
“no-fault” theory, this article proposes a procedure for secession. 
Furthermore, this procedure is empirically tested through analyses of 
secessions from former Yugoslavia. The main hypothesis is that se-
cession is justified in two cases: first, when secession occurs as a re-
sult of consensus of all the main actors, including central govern-
ment, and, second, when at least two-third majority of population 
supports secession. 
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 Generally speaking, secession is very popular neither among politicians 
nor among political scientists. According to Huntington “the twentieth cen-
tury bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as 
the nineteenth century bias against marital divorce” (Huntington, 1972: vii). 
It is not difficult to explain why. It is sufficient to recall what happened with 
Bosnia after secession and it become logical that minority of scientists sup-
port secessionism. However, recent history also gives reasons for more fa-
vourable treatment of this right. For example, six countries that were estab-
lished as a result of secessions (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) became new members of EU after successful democ-
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ratisation and economic transition. There is no doubt that these countries are 
better off now than they were before secession. In addition, there is no sig-
nificant movement in these countries that demands return to previous situa-
tion when these countries were part of multiethnic states. In other words, 
history shows that secession might end with war and terrible human suffer-
ing but also with a successful economic and political end economic devel-
opment of newly established states. Therefore, it is important to investigate, 
first, whether secession should be allowed, and, second, under which cir-
cumstances secession produces desired outcomes. These questions are im-
portant not only theoretically but also practically. For example, international 
community should decide, in the near future, what to do with Kosovo. 
Should this territory – which is formally still a part of Serbia – be recognized 
as an independent state? Obviously, very few questions in political science 
have such important practical value as the question whether secession should 
be allowed or not. 
 Before 1991, literature about right on secession was relatively scarce. 
However, Buchanan’s book (1991) sparked a very fruitful debate on this 
topic. The author articulated so called ‘remedial right to secession.’ Ac-
cording to the author, secession should be allowed only as a remedy against 
unjust conquest, exploitation, threat of extermination and threat of cultural 
extinction (Buchanan, 1991). D. Horowitz is probably the most radical critic 
of right to secession. According to him, the right to secede should be imple-
mented only in the cases of decolonisation, in the cases when all the main 
actors agree concerning dissolution of a country, and occasionally by inter-
national action (Horowitz, 2003: 12). Concerning the last exception, 
Horowitz does not explain what should be a precondition for such an inter-
national action, but claims that such an action does not require creation of 
certain rights. Nielsen claims that secession should be granted only for lib-
eral democratic societies (Nielsen, 1998).  
 In contrast to the theories above, a ‘no-fault’ theory of secession was ar-
ticulated.1 According to this theory, secession should be granted whenever 
people on certain territory (which is usually a federal unit) express their will 
to form an independent state. The best way for the expression is referenda. 
However, majority of authors argue that secession should be granted only 
when a qualified or supermajority of people express their will for independ-
ent state.  
 
1 See, for example, Philpott, “Self-Determination in Practice,” in Moore, ed., 1998: 79-102, 
Norman, “Domesticating Secession, “ in Macedo and Buchanan ed., 2003: 193-237, and Beran, 
“A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determinaton for a New World Order,” in Lehning 
(ed.), 1998: 32-59. 
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 From here this article will proceed the following way. First, the main ar-
guments against for secession will be presented. Second, on the basis of ‘no-
fault’ theory, a procedure for secession will be proposed. Than, this proce-
dure will be analysed on the basis of a case study of former Yugoslavia. The 
main conclusion of the article is that secession should be granted always 
when an overwhelming majority of population (al least two-third majority) 
demands this right.  
 
Arguments against and for secession 
 In his recent article, Horowitz (2003) summarizes the most important ar-
guments against secession. 
Secession, I shall argue, does not create the homogeneous successor 
states its proponents often assume will be created. Nor does secession 
reduce conflict, violence or minority oppression once successor states 
are established. Guarantees of minority protection in secessionist re-
gions are likely to be illusory: indeed, many secessionist movements 
have as one of their aims the expulsion or subordination of minorities 
in the secessionist regions. The very existence of a right to secede, 
moreover, is likely to dampen efforts at coexistence in the undivided 
state, including the adoption of federalism or regional autonomy, 
which might alleviate some of the grievances of putatively seces-
sionist minorities (Horowitz, 2003: 5-6).  
 In the literature it is also possible to find additional argument – secession 
is not in accordance with democratic principles because secessionists do not 
want to accept rule of majority in certain state.2  
 There is one point in which it is relatively to agree with Horowitz. In-
deed, when all the main actors agree concerning dissolution of a country, 
there is really no reason not to accept this dissolution. Czechoslovakia is an 
excellent example how dissolution may go smoothly when all the main ac-
tors do accept dissolution. Furthermore, when all the main actors agree about 
procedure for dissolution, there is also no reason not to accept it. For exam-
ple, both Serbia and Monte Negro agreed that secession should be allowed if 
55% of voters vote in favour of secession of Monte Negro, providing that at 
least 50% of voters participate in the referendum. Here, also secession pro-
ceeded without serous conflict. However, it is difficult to agree with 
Horowitz that secession should not be allowed when central government 
does not consent even if, for example, 99% of people in a federal unit vote in 
 
2 See, for example, Albot, “The Lincoln Proposition and the Spirit of Secession”, in 
Lehning (ed.), 1998: 182-207. 
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favour of secession. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the weight of 
Horowitz’s argument against secession.  
 Concerning his first argument, it is not clear whether homogeneity is, for 
Horowitz, a positive attribute of a state or not. If homogeneity is a positive 
attribute, secession is a positive process, because it usually creates more ho-
mogenous countries. If total ethnical homogeneity is not a desirable solution, 
there is no reason to prohibit right to secession.  
 With regard to minority rights, it is sure that their position should not 
necessary improve after secession, that position of minorities can worsen, 
but it unclear why, according to Horowitz, position of minorities is neces-
sarily worse in secessionist countries than in multiethnic countries. Experi-
ence does not confirm Horowitz’s claim. For example, position of minorities 
in secessionist Monte Negro today is for sure much better than it use to be in 
multiethnic Yugoslavia. Did USSR better protect minority rights than, for 
example, Ukraine today? In addition, the very demand for secession shows 
that minority rights are not properly protected in a certain country (why oth-
erwise secession would be demanded?). So, alternative is either to tolerate 
violation of minority rights or to take risk and to allow secession, demanding 
from new established countries protection of minority rights. If alternative is 
to allow further violation of national and minority rights, as it was the case 
with Milošević’s Yugoslavia during the 1987-99 period, or to accept seces-
sion of oppressed nations, it is clear which solution is better. Furthermore, it 
is much easier to put pressure on newly established countries – that seek in-
ternational recognition and membership in international organizations – than 
older ones to protect minority rights. Finally, it is unclear why Horowitz as-
sumes that relatively homogenous countries like, for example, Italy are less 
able to protect minority rights than multiethnic ones. On the contrary, even 
in the most stable democracies there is much more problems in multiethnic 
countries like, for example, UK, Spain or Belgian, than in homogenous 
countries like Norway. 
 Concerning conflict and violence, it is sure that secessions were fre-
quently followed by hostilities. However, it is questionable who should be 
blamed – people who support rightful secession or central governments that 
want to suppress secessions by killing people? To make a parallel: who 
should be blamed for violence in dictatorships – people who demand democ-
ratisation or dictators who kill those who want democracy? Should democ-
ratisation be banned because of possible human suffering that may occur 
during this process? Similarly, should have been decolonisation – which was 
actually process of secessionism – banned because many colonial powers 
used military in order to prevent secession? Furthermore, many secessionist 
movements occurred as a result of oppression on behalf of government. Ac-
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cording to D. Philpott (1998) those authors who are against right to seces-
sion ignore  
a different source of executions, deportations, and war – the denial of 
self-determination claims by oppressive larger states, which often 
strengthens separatist movements and leads them to take up arms in 
the first place. If the Soviet Union had not granted its constitutive re-
publics independence, instead seeking to perpetuate empire, would 
not the war in Chechnya have been replicated several times over?3 
 Hence, secession is usually response to violence rather than a cause of 
violence. Indeed, had the Soviet Union used military in order to prevent se-
cessions, who should have been blamed for the violence – the Soviet Union 
or secessionist republics?  
  Horowitz argues that right to secede dampens adoption of federalism. 
However, just opposite is the true. Right to secede may increase chances for 
adoption of federalism. For example, proposal of the Constitution of Euro-
pean Union explicitly claims, in article I-60, “any member state may decide 
to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional re-
quirements.”4 There is no doubt that, without this provision, it would be im-
possible to ratify the Constitution. Only if nations voluntarily join a federa-
tion – knowing that they may withdraw from it – federation can be an ac-
ceptable solution for multiethnic countries. In other words, right to secede 
fosters rather than dampens adoption of federalism. After all, if a nation pre-
fers independence to federation, federation is not an optimal solution.  
 The least persuasive of all the arguments that Horowitz offers is the fol-
lowing. “Since most secessionist movements will be resisted by central gov-
ernments and most secessionists receive insufficient foreign military assis-
tance to success it is likely to increase ultimately fruitless secessionist war-
fare” (Horowitz, 2003: 6). Let us assume that somebody says that divorce 
should not be allowed because it very likely that women would be beaten in 
this case, adding that it is very likely that nobody would want to help beaten 
women. Would such an argument be acceptable? And what is a difference 
between argument that secession should not be allowed because central gov-
ernment is likely to kill many people who demands secession and argument 
that possible physical violence is impediment for right to divorce. The very 
fact that central government is willing to kill people in order to prevent their 
will, expressed in a democratic form like referenda, is the crucial argument 
that certain ethnic group should try to find solution outside such a country. 
For example, some Croats were against secession from Yugoslavia. How-
 
3 Daniel Philpott, “Self-Determination in Practice,” in Moore, ed., 1998: 92. 
4 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/constitution_29.10.04/part_I_EN.pdf 
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ever, when, Yugoslav military started to attack on Croatia, wanting to pre-
vent secession, even those people who were initially in favour of unity ac-
cepted the project of independent Croatia. In addition, Slovenia and Croatia 
showed that secessionist warfare could be fruitful. So, in contrast to 
Horowitz’s argument, only peaceful means for protection of unity can be ac-
cepted in a multiethnic country. If central government decides to use force in 
order to prevent democratically expressed will for secession it should be 
only an additional argument in favour of international recognition of seces-
sionist countries. Slovenian and Croatian case show that recognition of se-
cessionist countries was an appropriate decision of international community 
that prevented escalation of violence in these two countries. 
 It is unclear form Horowitz’s argument why even decolonisation was an 
acceptable process. This process did not produce homogeneous states, it did 
not solve problems of minority protection and violence frequently occurred 
when former countries became independent states. Logical consequence of 
Horowitz’s arguments is that, for example, the USA must not have separated 
from the UK. If above mentioned arguments against secession were valid, 
India, with its all but homogeneous structure, would still be a part of the UK, 
Algeria a part of France and Indonesia a part of Netherlands. Of course, it is 
possible to argue that colonies did have right to secede because people felt 
oppressed by colonial rulers. However, in this case is unclear why Lithuani-
ans, who felt oppressed by Russia, did not have right on secession without 
Russian consent. Or, let us assume that USSR, after occupying Poland at the 
end of the WWII, proclaimed Poland to be a part of Russia (as it used to be 
before WWI). Would it mean that Poland in this case would not have had 
right to struggle for independence without consent form Moscow? In other 
words, according to Horowitz, the best tactics for aggressors and dictators is 
to be stubborn, because territorial gains would be sanctioned forever. 
Horowitz arguments could be a powerful tool for aggressors and dictators. 
 From the analyses above it is clear that it is difficult to accept Horowitz’s 
radical rejection of almost any secessionist demand. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to analyse less strict anti-secessionist theories. Should secession be al-
lowed only as a remedy against unjust conquest, exploitation, threat of ex-
termination and threat of cultural extinction, as Buchanan proposes? W. 
Norman provides very strong argument against such a criterion 
Secessionist and unionists are likely to disagree about what kinds of 
incident or events can give just cause to secede, about whether such 
events can give just cause to secede, about whether they have been or 
could be rectified by measures short of secession, about whether any 
particular violations were significant enough, and so on.5  
 
5 Norman, “Domesticating Secession“, in Macedo and Buchanan ed., 2003: 200.  
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 To illustrate, leading scholars in Serbia argued that Croatia and Slovenia 
exploited Serbia in former Yugoslavia. In contrast, Croatian and Slovenian 
economic experts claimed just opposite – that Serbia exploited these two re-
publics.6 At the beginning of the war, Croats and Bosnians argued that they 
faced extinction on behalf of Serbs, and Serbs argued just opposite. All sides 
justified secessionist movements by threat of extinction. Differences in 
opinions among experts for this region outside Yugoslavia were barely nar-
rower than opinions among experts inside Yugoslavia.7 Finally, at that time, 
the leading world’s politicians also had very different opinions about right-
ness of secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mace-
donia. Therefore, there is no better way to decide whether a territory is right-
fully part of a multiethnic state than to ask the very people whether they are 
voluntarily inside a part of such a country. In other words, decision about se-
cession should be based on referenda about secession, rather than on subjec-
tive judgments of international bureaucrats.  
 It is important to address also Nilsen’s (1998) theory that claims that 
secession should be granted only for liberal democratic societies. First, lib-
eral democracies were rather consequences than prerequisites of secessions. 
USA became liberal democracy after secession; many former colonies with-
out any liberal experience, for example India, gradually become liberal de-
mocracies. The same process also occurred in Eastern Europe at the recent 
time. Therefore it is difficult to agree with Nielsen’s claim that 
our thinking about … secession should be significantly different 
when we are talking about [liberal democracies] than when we are 
talking about the nations of the former Soviet Union, the former 
Yugoslavia, or of much of Africa and the Indian subcontinent where 
often the nationalisms in questions are what Carol Prager has aptly 
called barbarous nationalism (Nielsen, 1998: 254). 
 To illustrate, the Civil War in the USA was much more barbarous than 
secession of Baltic Republics form the USSR.8 Indeed, after Vietnam and 
Iraq it is very difficult to assess which nationalism is barbarous, and where 
we can find the most liberal societies. Nielsen claims that USA, UK and 
Canada are not former Yugoslavia. A cynical response to this statement can 
be that, indeed, Slovenia does not have Abu Graib and Guantanamo; there is 
no dispute in Slovenia about regularity of elections; Slovenian police can 
 
6 See Stallaerts, “The Disintegration of Yugoslav Intellectual Community,” in Coppieters 
and Huysseune ed., 2002: 141-58.  
7 Compare, for example, Thomas, 2003: 3-39, who completely supports Serbian prospective 
about causes of dissolution of Yugoslavia with Cigar, 1995, who put all the blames on Serbia.  
8 620,000 Americans were killed during the Civil War; see Ostrowski in Gordon (ed.), 
1998: 155. 
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hold someone in custody only for 48 hours, and nobody is allowed for wire-
tapping without permission of a Court. The point is that, concerning seces-
sion, we should have unique criteria for all the states in the world rather than 
special provisions for “civilised nations”.  
 Finally, it is also important to address Lincoln’s argument that secession 
should not be allowed because it would annual rule of majority.9 Dahl for-
mulated this argument on the following way: “Granting [the right to seces-
sion] would make a state, or any coercive organization impossible (or at any 
rate illegitimate), since any group facing coercion on any matter could de-
mand and through secession gain autonomy. In effect, anarchism would be 
legitimised” (Dahl, 1989: 196). First thing that should be noted is that in 
great majority of cases secession did not occur against will of majority but 
rather against will of a dictator(ship). Fourteen republics seceded from the 
USSR, which was a dictatorship, four republics seceded from Yugoslavia 
(after the first democratic elections), which was a dictatorship, and colonies 
seceded from colonial powers that established dictatorial systems in their 
colonies. Furthermore, rule of majority is not always in accordance with de-
mocratic principles. For example, by the year 2000, majority of people in 
Serbia supported S. Milošević, a person who was indicted as a war criminal. 
The strongest opposition leader was V. Šešelj, another inmate at the Interna-
tional Tribunal in Hague. So, what should have Albanian national minority 
in Kosovo done: to obey rule of majority or to secede from a country in 
which majority of population voted for war criminals?  
 However, should secession also be allowed from a country that is per-
fectly democratic, a country that accepts minority and individual rights, but 
in which majority of people is against secession of a part of that country? 
For example, in 1905, majority of people in Sweden (that was composed of 
that what is today Sweden and Norway) was probably against secession of 
Norway. Nevertheless, in Norway, 368,208 people voted for secession and 
only 272 people voted against secession! (Ostrowski, 1998: 183). Should 
have Sweden, in this case, sent military force in order to secure rule of ma-
jority, i.e. to prevent secession? The answer is definitely no because, as J. 
Raskin has written, “governmental legitimacy depends upon the affirmative 
consent of those who are governed” (Raskin, 1993: 1444) Similarly, ac-
cording to Orentlicher,  
international law no longer abides colonization or forcible annexa-
tion. But if these forms of non-consensual rule cannot be reconciled 
with principles inherent in the right of self-determination, surely 
those same principles are challenged be a state’s continued assertion 
 
9 See Abott, in Lehning (ed.), 1998: 182-207 and Ostrowski, 1998: 155-90. 
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of sovereignty over a defined population that has unambiguously re-
jected its authority.10  
 
Procedure for secession 
 From the analysis above it is obvious that weight of argument goes in fa-
vour of right to secede. At the end, secessions do occur regularly. The world 
community of states has increased from 30 in 1945 to around 200 counties in 
2006. This means that, on average, 2-3 new secessions occur yearly. There-
fore, the appropriate question is not whether secession should be allowed but 
under which conditions. For as only a minority in certain unit supports se-
cession, it is obvious that secession is not justified.  
 Secession usually occurs either as a result of decision by a representative 
body or as a result of referenda about secession. Authors who support seces-
sion usually argue in favour of referenda, as the best tool for expression of 
voters’ opinion about secession. For example, Buchanan (1991) thinks that 
three-quarter majority should be required (Buchanan, 1991: 100). Norman 
(1998) argues in favour of majority of registered voters.11 Weinstock (2001) 
also support supermajority without specifying which percentage should sup-
port secession (Weinstock, 2001: 197). In fact, only Beran (1998) does not 
demand any supermajority for secession.12 So, which majority should be re-
quired for secession – simple, majority of all voters, two-third majority of 
those who voted, two-third majority of all the voters, three-quarter majority 
of those who voted or three-fourth majority of all the voters? This article ar-
gues that the best procedure is to demand two-third majority of all the voters. 
The reason for this procedure is the following. Modern democracies demand 
supermajority for the change of constitution. Since secession of a territory 
changes constitutional arrangement of a country, it is completely justified to 
demand supermajority. Moreover, secession influences constitutional ar-
rangement even more than, for example, a change from semipresidentialism 
to parliamentarism. Therefore, it is not acceptable to secede on the basis of 
simple majority of votes cast. In contrast, secession procedure should be 
even more demanding than for a change of political system. Hence, although 
many countries enable changes of constitution without referenda, secession 
without expression of will of population is less preferable a solution. But 
why two-third majority of all the voters should be demanded? Why not two-
third majority of votes cast, or even three-third majority of all the voters. 
 
10 Orentlicher, International Responses to Separatist Claims, in Macedo and Buchanan, 
2003: 26.  
11 See, Norman in Moore ed., 1998: 54.  
12 See, Beran, in Lehning (ed.), 1998: 38.  
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This article argues in favour of two-third majority on the basis of experience 
of secessions from former Yugoslavia. In three republics that had two-third 
majority in referenda, political development after secession shows that se-
cession was probably the best choice. The fourth republic, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, did not achieved two-third majority, and political development 
after secession has not proved by now that secession was the best solution. 
The only exception was Montenegro, as already mentioned above, where 
less than fifty percent of all voters voted in favour of secession but secession 
still proceeded relatively smoothly. However, in this case dissolution oc-
curred on the basis of procedure arranged on the basis of an agreement of 
both republics. Of course, it is difficult to defend a principle on the basis of 
investigation of only one region. However, it is possible to argue that politi-
cal processes in the former Yugoslavia suggest the above-mentioned super-
majority. The next section will explain this issue in more details.  
 Requirement for a qualified majority of population in referenda is possi-
ble to defend also on the basis of political realism. If only a slight majority 
of population supports secession, military action on behalf of central gov-
ernment has very favourable odds for success. However, if a very high per-
centage of population – for example, ninety percent – supports secession 
than it is not only immoral but also, most likely, fruitless to prevent seces-
sion by force. Therefore, referenda on secession and demand for superma-
jority enable both side – secessionist and antisecessionist – a realistic as-
sessment about odds for success. In a way, a referendum is counting of po-
tential number of bayonets on secessionist and anti-secessionist side. Exam-
ple of Iraq shows that it is very difficult, even for the strongest superpower, 
to control a country that does not want foreign troops. Similarly, if central 
government wants to prevent secession by force, people would start to per-
ceive central governments forces as occupying forces and would start to re-
sist occupation militarily. People in Croatia and Slovenia did not have any 
better opinion about Yugoslav National Army, after it started military action 
against secession of these two republics, than Russians had about German 
troops on their soil during the WWII. At the end, these two republics – in 
which overwhelming majority supported secession – defended themselves 
from military intervention on behalf of central government.  
 On the other hand, if a significant majority opposes secession, anti-seces-
sionist troops have advantage, because they may count on military supply on 
behalf of central government. In other words, if there is not enough support 
for secession, secessionist may give up or postpone demand for independ-
ence. In contrast, when an overwhelming majority supports secession, cen-
tral government may – if it is willing to act rationally – accept secession and 
try do develop friendly relationship with the newly established country. 
Scandinavian countries are a good example for such a rational approach to-
ward secession. 
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 The second important question that should be addressed is whether it 
should be the lowest threshold in number of population at certain region that 
may demand secession. If this provision does not exist, it would mean that, 
for example, a group of neighbours may demand an independent state. Inde-
pendent statehood provides many privileges (for example, vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly of the UN) and duties (for example, to open embassies in 
other countries). Therefore, it is logical to demand certain threshold in order 
one unit to be recognized as an independent state. Probably the best lower 
limit would be 100,000 inhabitants. A higher limit would not be acceptable 
because many small countries function very well. For example, country with 
the highest GDP per capita in the world, Luxemburg, has only 450,000 in-
habitants.13 A lower limit than 100,000 inhabitants would also not be 
appropriate – due to the reasons explained above – except under special cir-
cumstances.14 
 To conclude, secession should be allowed when cost of suppressing 
secession is higher than cost of allowing secession. In concrete terms, it 
means that secession should be allowed when an overwhelming majority (at 
least two-third of all the voters) supports secession. This conclusion will be 
now empirically tested on a case study of secessions from former Yugoslavia. 
 
Case study: Secessions from former Yugoslavia 
 It is interesting that Milošević, the main perpetrator of wars on the terri-
tory of former Yugoslavia, used exactly Horowitz’s arguments for his mili-
tary attacks on other nations in former Yugoslavia. Milošević argued, during 
the entire 1987-1999 period, that he only wants to prevent the cracked foun-
dations of the right to secede. However, historical facts were the following.  
 First, secession of four republics was in accordance with Yugoslav’ con-
stitution. Article 1 of the Yugoslav Constitution (1974) stated: "The Federa-
tive People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's State, republican 
in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the 
right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed 
their will to live together in a federative State [italics added]." Second, con-
stitutions of the republics also granted right to secession. Third, leadership of 
seceding republics had electoral legitimacy based on fair elections. In Mace-
donia, a coalition of two leftist parties won elections. In Croatia, Slovenia 
 
13 The World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 300.  
14 Special cases could be same historical reasons (for example, Andorra, Monaco, etc.) or 
geographical position, especially when islands demand independent statehood (for example, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, etc.). 
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and Bosnia and Herzegovina oppositional parties won elections. Communist 
parties in these republics accepted electoral results and transferred power to 
the winners. In contrast, federal institutions did not have any electoral le-
gitimacy. The communist party, which held power for fourthly six years, ap-
pointed politicians in federal institutions. In other words, it was a war be-
tween old communist elite, which tried to prevent secession, and new de-
mocratically elected elites that defended right to secession. Furthermore, in 
Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia more than two-third of citizens supported 
secession. In Croatia 88.2% of all the eligible voters supported independ-
ence. The same figure was 86% in Slovenia and 74% in Macedonia. 15 These 
data show that secession of these republics was not only legal but also le-
gitimate. Only in Bosnia and Herzegovina support for secession was less 
than two-third (63%) (Woodward, 1995: 218). These data show that a ma-
jority of people in Yugoslavia was for dissolution of this country. This 
means that Lincoln’s argument against secession cannot be applied in the 
case of former Yugoslavia. Finally, the Badinter Commission, established by 
the European Union and composed of 5 judges from Constitutional Courts of 
West European Countries, confirmed the legality of secessions.16  
 Political development after secession might also be a criterion for evalua-
tion of justifiability of secession. So, was secession of Slovenia, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to this criterion, a mis-
take? Was international recognition of these new states – forced mainly on 
behalf of Germany – a mistake? In the cases of first three republics the an-
swer is definitely no. For seventy-two years Yugoslavia was a very quarrel-
some country, and almost entire time it was a dictatorship. In contrast, Slo-
venia is today a member of the EU and Croatia is an official candidate for 
the membership in the EU. Macedonia is also on the way to join the EU. All 
these countries are now consolidated democracies. Therefore, they do not 
have reasons to peaty for seceding from Serbia, a country in which 
Milošević’s ascender in power, Stambolić, was assassinated; his follower in 
power, Đinđic, was assassinated; leader of independent journalism, Ćuruvia, 
was assassinated; Milošević’s right hand for covered operation in Croatia 
and BH, Arkan, was assassinated; President of “the third Yugoslavia”, 
Milošević, died in jail in Hague; former President of Serbia, Milutinović is 
in jail in Hague; leader of opposition, Šešelj is in jail in Hague; military Joint 
Chief of Staff is in jail in Hague; and notorious Mladić, general who was re-
 
15 See, Cohen, “Ending the War and Securing Peace in former Yugoslavia”, in Meštrović 
(ed.), 1996: 47, note 19.  
16 Mesic, 1994: 315. According to Horowitz, decision of Badinter Commission was “ill 
considered.” However, their decision was based, as explained above, on provisions in both fed-
eral constitution and constitutions of the republics. In other words, Horowitz argues that judges 
should have not decided on the basis of laws. 
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sponsible for atrocities in B and H hides in Serbia and until recently received 
his salary from the Serbian government. Until a short time ago, he even did 
not have reasons to hide because government refused to extradite him to 
Hague.  
 In addition, there was only one republic that decided, in the 1992 referen-
dum, to stay united with Serbia. So, Serbia had opportunity to show to 
Monte Negro that Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina made mistakes seceding from Yugoslavia, and it had opportunity to 
show that these republics would be better of staying in federation. However, 
recently, even Monte Negro seceded from the remnants of Yugoslavia. Kos-
ovo too is on its way of independence, and there it can be expected that Al-
banians (90 percent of population) would vote for independence. Albanian 
population in Kosovo certainly does not have nostalgia for Yugoslavia. 
These recent events show that those units that stayed in Yugoslavia made 
mistake rather than republics that seceded.  
 The only republic for which it is questionable whether it was wise to se-
cede is BH. This country experienced terrible loses in human life during the 
war and even today this country can function only as an international pro-
tectorate. Why Bosnia was exception? There were many reasons for Bosnian 
tragedy. This country was completely disarmed before secession. In contrast, 
those who were against secession of Bosnia from Yugoslavia were armed to 
the teeth. Furthermore, international community imposed arms embargo, 
which severely damaged pro-Bosnian troops. Moreover, international com-
munity made many mistakes during the war in this country. Western country 
did not want to help Bosnian government militarily up to the very end of the 
war. All these mistakes had very important influence on tragedy in Bosnia. 
However, internal problems of this country were decisive. Serbs, which con-
stituted 31% of population, firmly rejected idea of Bosnian independence. 
Croats did support secession of Bosnia form Yugoslavia, but many of them 
supported secession of municipalities with Croatian majority from Bosnia 
and unification of these municipalities with Croatia. Only Bosniaks firmly 
supported Bosnian secession and territorial integrity. However, they were 
only a plurality of population (39.5 percent) (Goldstein, 1999: 240). In other 
words, destiny of Bosnia was different because population of this country 
did not overwhelmingly supported secession, as it was the case with Slove-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia.  
 Finally, it should be added the case study of former Yugoslavia also does 
not support Buchanan’s theory that secession should be granted only as re-
medial right and only on the basis of at least three-quarter support for seces-
sion. In Macedonia, support for secession was below that threshold. How-
ever, secession of this republic occurred relatively peacefully. 
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 So, what we can conclude about secession on the basis of the analysis in 
this article? The most important conclusion is that numbers matters. Seces-
sion should be always allowed when at least two-third majority of total 
population supports secession. In this case secession is morally and legally 
justified and militarily feasible. If support for secession is lower, it might be 
better to find alternative solutions. In this case, some sort of consociational 
democracy could be a preferable solution, especially in the cases where eth-
nic groups are intermingled. Finally, secession is also an acceptable solution 
when all the main actors agree about the procedure for secession, even in the 
case when support for secession is less than two-third, as it was the case with 
the secession of, for example, Slovakia and Montenegro.  
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